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Gathering Related Litigation in Illinois*
Thomas M. Mengler * *
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the procedures available in Illinois state courts
for combining related claims and consolidating related litigation
were grossly inadequate. Illinois courts, for example, had no
mechanism for consolidating related cases filed in different judicial
circuits. Illinois procedure provided no means by which a litigant
could have a case transferred from one judicial circuit to another
on grounds of convenience. Illinois had no compulsory counter-
claim rule.
Since 1981, however, the Illinois Supreme Court - arguably by
judicial fiat - has been transforming Illinois' gathering proce-
dures. In 1981, the court in Horn v. Rinckerl exercised its supervi-
sory powers under the Illinois Constitution to consolidate three
related cases filed in three different judicial circuits. Two years
later, the court in Torres v. Walsh 2 modified the 400-year-old com-
mon law doctrine of forum non conveniens to permit intrastate,
intercircuit transfer. Finally, in 1984, in Laue v. Leifheit,3 the
court held, contrary to the language of section 5 of the Contribu-
tion Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, that contribution claims among
joint tortfeasors must be filed in the plaintiff's original action.
The Illinois Supreme Court's ambitious foray is a laudable at-
tempt to reform Illinois joinder and consolidation law. Any proce-
dural system that prides itself on efficient adjudication should
provide effective mechanisms for making the transaction the item
of litigation.' Indeed, at a time when multiple, related litigation is
* Copyright © 1989 by Thomas M. Mengler. All rights reserved.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois; B.A., 1975, Carleton College;
M.A., 1977, University of Texas; J.D., 1981, University of Texas. This Article is based in
part on materials prepared for the Illinois Judicial Conference 1988-89 Regional Seminar
Series, Statutory Changes. I wish to thank my research assistants, Leonard Sachs and
Russell Benton, for their help.
1. 84 I1. 2d 139, 417 N.E.2d 1329 (1981).
2. 98 Ill. 2d 338, 456 N.E.2d 601 (1983).
3. 105 Il1. 2d 191, 473 N.E.2d 939 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Hazard, Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628 (1988) (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embody the
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increasingly more common' and court dockets are more clogged,6
efficient adjudication demands effective gathering.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court's efforts in this area are
praiseworthy, they are insufficient. Except on the issue of contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors, Illinois still lacks a compulsory
counterclaim rule. Moreover, although Horn provides a procedure
by which litigants can petition the Illinois Supreme Court to con-
solidate related cases, that mechanism is inadequate because of its
extraordinary nature. Any consolidation technique that depends
on discretionary review by an already-overtaxed supreme court is
destined inevitably to underutilization. Additional reform of Illi-
nois' joinder and consolidation mechanisms is still necessary and
must result from legislative reform of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure or from formal rulemaking by the Illinois Supreme
Court. Either approach would be preferable to the Illinois
Supreme Court's reform by discrete decisionmaking.
Part I of this Article describes the joinder, consolidation, and
transfer procedures available in Illinois prior to Horn, Torres, and
Laue. In effect, Part I describes the procedural landscape from
which the Illinois Supreme Court has been moving incrementally
over the last eight years. Part II describes and critically evaluates
the procedures made available by these three decisions. Together,
Parts I and II provide a complete picture of the procedures cur-
rently available in Illinois for gathering related claims or litigation.
In Part III, the Article broadly outlines some modest proposals for
reforming Illinois procedure, which will ensure that the entire
transaction or occurrence more frequently will become the item of
litigation in a single Illinois court. Those reforms include a com-
pulsory counterclaim rule and an intercircuit consolidation proce-
dure similar to the federal Multidistrict Litigation Act.7 These
proposals, while neither new nor radical, are significant. They
premise "that the unit of litigation should be the transaction as it occurred in the out-of-
court world").
5. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Preliminary Study of Complex Litigation I
(Mar. 31, 1987) [hereinafter ALl Complex Litigation Study] ("Over the past quarter cen-
tury, courts in the United States have witnessed an explosion of what loosely has been
labelled 'complex litigation.' ").
6. See, e.g., Illinois Division of Planning, Research, and Special Projects, Administra-
tive Office of the Illinois Courts, Circuit Court Calendar Management, January to Sep-
tember 1988, at 1-5 (1989) [hereinafter Illinois Calendar Management Study]
(establishing that 79% of all Illinois civil jury cases over $15,000 in value are
backlogged).
7. Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, § I, 82 Stat. 109 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
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would allow Illinois procedure to employ the gathering devices
that federal courts routinely have been employing for several years.
II. THE LANDSCAPE BEFORE HORN, TORRES, AND LAUE
It would be inaccurate to suggest that, prior to 1981, Illinois
procedural law actually discouraged use of the transaction or oc-
currence as the unit of litigation. The Code of Civil Procedure8
and common law doctrine then and now provide several mecha-
nisms for concentrating related claims in one forum. These mecha-
nisms, however, are grossly inadequate. The following sections
describe these mechanisms and reveal their limitations.
A. Joinder
In most respects, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure tracks the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on permissive joinder. Like the
Federal Rules, Illinois procedure provides that all claims between
opposing parties may be asserted in a single action.9 Illinois proce-
dure permits the joinder in a single action of all plaintiffs who have
claims arising out of the same transaction"° and of all defendants
against whom a claim is asserted arising out of the same transac-
tion. I Like the Federal Rules, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
provides for intervention, 12 interpleader, 3 impleader,' 4 and class
actions. I I
As with permissive joinder, Illinois procedure also tracks federal
law on compulsory joinder. The Illinois rule on res judicata re-
quires a claimant to assert in the single action all rights and
grounds of relief arising out of the same transaction. ' 6 The Illinois
provision on necessary and indispensable parties, section 405 of the
Illinois Code,' 7 is similar to rule 19 of the Federal Rules. Section
405 requires claimants to join all persons who have an interest in
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-101 (1987).
9. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-614(a)
(1987).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-404 (1987).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-405 (1987).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-408 (1987).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-409 (1987).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-406 (1987).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0, paras. 2-801 to 2-806 (1987).
16. See, e.g., Spiller v. Continental Tube Co., 95 111. 2d 423, 432, 447 N.E.2d 834, 838
(1983) (res judicata extends "not only to questions which were actually litigated but also
to all questions which could have been raised or determined").
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-405 (1987).
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the subject matter of the suit and whose interests may be impaired
or impeded if they are not joined.
The Illinois Code, however, differs substantially from the Fed-
eral Rules in the area of counterclaims. Illinois permits, but does
not require, counterclaims when they arise out of the same events
as the plaintiff's complaint.' 8 By allowing the defendant to choose
when and where it will bring its factually related claim against the
plaintiff, 9 the Illinois Code encourages the kind of duplication that
it seeks to discourage by its permissive joinder rules.
B. Statutory Consolidation
The Illinois Code provides a very modest device for consolidat-
ing factually and legally related lawsuits. Section 2-1006 of the
Code states that "actions pending in the same court may be consol-
idated, as an aid to convenience, whenever it can be done without
prejudice to a substantial right."' 2° The circuit court may order
consolidation for pretrial purposes alone, or for both pretrial and
trial purposes. 2' The test for determining if consolidation is proper
is whether the cases "contain common questions of law and fact,
which could and should have readily been determined at the same
time."' 22 Stated pragmatically, the question may be framed: Does
it make sense, taking into account judicial economy and fairness to
the parties, to consolidate these cases for discovery? Does it make
sense to try these cases together?
Section 2-1006, however, cannot be employed to consolidate re-
lated litigation filed throughout the state. In Horn, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the language of section 2-1006 - "pend-
ing in the same court" - precludes intercircuit consolidation. 3
The Horn court held that a circuit court lacked the authority to
consolidate cases "pending in three different counties, in three dif-
18. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 13 with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-608 (1987).
19. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-608 (1987) (historical and practice notes).
"However, in contrast to Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... it does
not require that a defendant immediately assert his rights by way of counterclaim if it
would be inconvenient or strategically inadvisable." Id.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1006 (1987).
21. The power to consolidate only for pretrial purposes is implicit in the circuit
court's severance power, also authorized under section 2-1006.
22. Clore v. Fredman, 59 Il. 2d 20, 28, 319 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1974) (reversing trial
court's refusal to consolidate landlord's forcible entry action with tenants' class action
against the same landlord for injunctive relief preventing the landlord from evicting
them).
23. Horn, 84 11. 2d at 147, 417 N.E.2d at 1333.
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ferent circuits, and, consequently, in three different courts."24
Thus, statutory consolidation, by itself, is an imperfect gathering
device which is unable to reach across circuits.
C Dismissal or Stay of Proceedings
An Illinois court can sometimes avoid duplicative litigation by
dismissing the suit or by staying its hand. Section 2-619(a)(3) of
the Illinois Code authorizes a court to dismiss an action on
grounds that "there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause. "25 The Illinois Supreme Court has in-
terpreted that section to allow a court for the same reasons to stay,
rather than to dismiss, proceedings.26 The provision requires that
the parties in both actions be identical or in privity with each
other2 7 and that the actions seek relief arising out of the same state
of facts or identical transaction or occurrence. 28 Typically, section
2-619(a)(3) is a first-in-time rule.29 However, even if the provi-
sion's requirements are met and the other suit was filed first, the
trial court has discretion to proceed with the action on grounds of
convenience or when the earlier action is filed in a different
jurisdiction.30
As interpreted, section 2-619(a)(3) is a relatively ineffective gath-
ering device. There are two significant limitations. First, a trial
court may grant a motion to dismiss or stay only if plaintiffs and
defendants are essentially identical in the pending cases. The deci-
sion in People v. Gitchoff3' exemplifies this requirement. Gitchoff
was a mass tort case involving the devastating explosion of a rail-
road tank car. The explosion injured or killed several people and
produced nine lawsuits. Six were filed in Macon County; one was
filed in Cook County; one was filed in Madison County; and one
24. Id. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Horn, see infra notes 46-54 and
accompanying text.
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-619(a)(3) (1987).
26. See People ex rel. Dept. of Public Aid v. Santos, 92 Il. 2d 120, 440 N.E.2d 876
(1982).
27. Baker v. Salomon, 31 I11. App. 3d 278, 334 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist. 1975); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-619(a)(3) (1987) (historical and practice notes) ("real touch-
stone of the inquiry whether there is sufficient similarity of parties is prejudice to the
parties").
28. Skolnick v. Martin, 32 Ill. 2d 55, 203 N.E.2d 428 (1964) (construing identical
statutory predecessor of section 2-619(a)(3)).
29. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., 84 Ill. 2d 245, 252, 419 N.E.2d 23, 26-27
(1981) (holding first-in-time status is not "determinative"). For a discussion of Swift, see
infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
30. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 84 Il1. 2d at 251-53, 419 N.E.2d at 27-28.
31. 65 Ill. 2d 249, 357 N.E.2d 534 (1976).
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was filed in federal district court in Alton. The defendants in the
nine lawsuits were all common, but the plaintiffs were not. Ac-
cordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the procedure of
dismissing or staying under section 2-619(a)(3) could not be uti-
lized because the nine pending actions did not involve the "same
parties. '3 2 Gitchoff indicates that a section 2-619(a)(3) dismissal or
stay is not appropriate when pending actions have common de-
fendants and arise out of the same occurrence, but do not have
common plaintiffs.
Second, section 2-619(a)(3) arguably does not permit a court to
dismiss reactive litigation. A reactive suit is one filed by the named
defendant in a pending action that arises out of the same transac-
tion as stated in the pending action.33 Because reactive litigation
would amount to a counterclaim in the pending action, a court's
dismissal of reactive litigation under section 2-619(a)(3) would un-
dermine legislative intent by turning the Code's permissive coun-
terclaim rule into a compulsory rule.34
The Illinois Supreme Court, though not holding that dismissal
of reactive litigation is always inappropriate, has cautioned against
its routine dismissal in A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co. 35 In
Staley, Swift and Staley entered into an agreement in which Staley
purchased from Swift a soybean-processing plant in Des Moines,
Iowa. 36 At the time of the purchase, the plant was still under con-
struction. Under the agreement's terms, Swift was obliged to com-
plete the plant's construction. Subsequently, the deal soured and
Swift filed suit against Staley in Iowa state court.37 Swift sought
recovery of money retained by Staley to secure construction of the
plant.
The same day, but one hour later, Staley sued Swift in Illinois
circuit court, seeking damages for Swift's failure to complete the
32. The Illinois Supreme Court in Gitchoff permitted a circuit court to consolidate
two actions filed in different circuits, not because such consolidation is statutorily author-
ized, but because the circuit judge in the other circuit had refused to comply with the first
judge's consolidation order. Id. at 257, 357 N.E.2d at 538-39; see also Horn, 84 Ill. 2d at
146-47, 417 N.E.2d at 1333.
33. R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 148 (West 1985).
34. The historical and practice notes to the counterclaim rule, section 2-608, under-
line the legislature's intent that section 2-608 "does not require that a defendant immedi-
ately assert his rights by way of counterclaim if it would be inconvenient or strategically
inadvisable." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-608 (1987) (historical and practice notes).
35. 84 11. 2d 245, 419 N.E.2d 23 (1981).
36. Id. at 247, 419 N.E.2d at 24.
37. Id. at 248, 419 N.E.2d at 24.
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plant.38 Swift then moved to dismiss or stay Staley's Illinois ac-
tion. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Swift's con-
tention that section 2-619(a)(3) was a per se first-in-time rule,
compelling the Illinois circuit court to dismiss Staley's suit on
grounds that a related suit between the same parties had been filed
first, one hour earlier. 39 The court reasoned that "dismissal of Sta-
ley's action would force it to seek the relief it desires by way of
counterclaim in Swift's Iowa action. It is not clear that such a
course is required under Iowa procedural rules, yet a ruling here
against Staley would create such a rule de facto."
By its holding, the Illinois Supreme Court suggested that em-
ploying section 2-619(a)(3) to create indirectly a compulsory coun-
terclaim rule in Illinois would undermine the Illinois General
Assembly's intent with respect to its permissive counterclaim rule,
section 2-608. 1' Therefore, Staley arguably stands for the proposi-
tion that duplicative litigation filed by the plaintiff in the pending
action may be stayed or dismissed, but not reactive litigation filed
later by the defendant in the pending action.
D. Transfer of Venue and Forum Non Conveniens
The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure contains no provision for
transfer on grounds of convenience similar to the federal transfer
provision. The Code provides for transfer of venue to another cir-
cuit only in two circumstances. First, pursuant to section 2-106, a
court in one circuit must transfer a case to another circuit if venue
is not proper in the first circuit.42 Second, pursuant to section 2-
1001, the court may transfer a case to a convenient county when a
litigant fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial in the court
in which the action is pending. Transfer is proper when either "the
inhabitants of the county [are] prejudiced against him or her ... or
his or her attorney, or the adverse party has an undue influence
over the minds of the inhabitants. 4 3 In neither of these two cir-
cumstances is transfer permitted solely or even primarily on
grounds of convenience or judicial efficiency. The Illinois Code
does not provide any means by which a circuit court can achieve
efficiencies by transferring a case to a circuit of proper venue,
where other related litigation is pending.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 252-53, 419 N.E.2d at 26-27.
40. Id. at 253, 419 N.E.2d at 27.
41. See also People v. Santos, 92 11. 2d 120, 126, 440 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1982).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-106(a) (1987).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1001 (1987).
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Prior to the Horn and Torres decisions, the only procedure that
occasionally could achieve the same result was the common law
doctrine of forum non conveniens. As understood by Illinois
courts prior to Torres, that doctrine permitted a court to dismiss,
but not to transfer, a case on grounds of convenience.' The first
court might dismiss a case on grounds that there was a second
circuit of proper venue where other related litigation was pending,
hoping that the plaintiff would file his or her action in the more
convenient circuit. The desired result, however, was not always
the only alternative. The plaintiff could just as easily file his or her
action in a third court of proper venue, perhaps one more conve-
nient than the first court, where no related litigation was pending.
The optimal result, while sometimes achievable, was contingent on
the number of alternative places of proper venue, the cooperation
of plaintiffs, and the cooperation of circuit judges.4"
Thus, before the Illinois Supreme Court began in 1981 to trans-
form Illinois joinder and consolidation procedures, Illinois circuit
courts lacked the tools to gather related litigation into one forum.
By favoring a litigant's choice of forum over judicial economy, Illi-
nois procedure promoted the waste of judicial and litigant
resources.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S REFORM EFFORTS
Beginning in 1981 and culminating in 1984, the supreme court
by means of three decisions converted Illinois procedure from an
inefficient system for processing related claims to a moderately ef-
44. See Torres v. Walsh, 98 I11. 2d 338, 456 N.E.2d 601 (1983).
45. Although not itself a gathering procedure, the doctrine of collateral estoppel also
can be employed to combat the problem of serial, related litigation. Since Illinois has
abandoned the mutuality doctrine, see Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution
Control, 18 Ill. 2d 1, 398 N.E.2d 9 (1979), a litigant who was not a party in the original
action, under certain circumstances, can prevent a second litigant who was a party to the
first action from relitigating an issue already decided against the second litigant. Mohn v.
International Vermiculite Co., 147 Ill. App. 3d 717, 498 N.E.2d 375 (4th Dist. 1986). In
particular, offensive use of collateral estoppel could be effective in preventing the relitiga-
tion of common issues in the situation in which a large number of persons are injured
under similar circumstances by the same defendant. See ALI Complex Litigation Study,
supra note 5, at 72.
Like the other procedures already discussed, however, this use of collateral estoppel
has its limitations too. First, it does not prevent the duplication of pretrial proceedings
prior to the first verdict against defendant. Second, many judges and commentators are
reluctant to estop a defendant from litigating in several later cases because one early
verdict - perhaps an aberration - went against the defendant. See id.; Currie, Mutual-
ity of Estoppel Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1967).
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fective one. The following discussion explains the holdings of these
three decisions and critically evaluates them.
A. Horn v. Rincker
46
In Horn, a three vehicle collision led to three suits in three differ-
ent counties: St. Clair; Madison; and Shelby. Because venue was
proper in all three counties, transfer pursuant to section 2-106 of
the Code was unavailable. 47 Because the cases were not pending in
the "same court," they could not be consolidated under section 2-
1006.48 Finally, none of the three courts could dismiss or stay pro-
ceedings under section 2-619(a)(3) - and thereby indirectly com-
pel the parties to file their suits in the same county - because the
three actions, although arising out of the same transaction, did not
involve the same parties.4 9 The Illinois Code, therefore, provided
no means by which a circuit judge could consolidate the three cases
for pretrial and trial.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, was not so easily deterred.
Invoking its general administrative and supervisory authority
granted by article VI, section 16 of the Illinois Constitution,5 ° the
court ordered the St. Clair County and Madison County cases
transferred to Shelby County and consolidated with the case pend-
ing in that court.51 Article VI, section 16 provides the supreme
court with "[g]eneral administrative and supervisory authority
over all courts." That article also provides the constitutional basis
for the supreme court's concurrent power, along with the Illinois
General Assembly, to promulgate rules of procedure for the Illi-
nois courts. 2 In Horn, the court interpreted article VI, section 16
to permit it to regulate practice and procedure by appellate deci-
sion, as well as by formal rule.
Thus, Horn established a procedure for consolidating related
cases filed in different judicial circuits. As the court explained, a
litigant can seek intercircuit consolidation by filing an original peti-
tion with the Illinois Supreme Court. 3  The Illinois Supreme
46. 84 II1. 2d 139, 417 N.E.2d 1329 (1981).
47. Id. at 145-46, 417 N.E.2d at 1332-33.
48. Id. at 146-48, 417 N.E.2d at 1333.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
50. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
51. Horn, 84 IlI. 2d at 151, 417 N.E.2d at 1334.
52. People v. Capoldi, 37 II1. 2d 11, 16, 225 N.E.2d 634, 637, (1967); ILL. CONST. art.
VI, § 16 (constitutional commentary) ("The Supreme Court has recognized that the Gen-
eral Assembly may act, where it was at least arguable that the court has inherent rule
making power, if the Court has not acted.")
53. Horn, 84 Ill. 2d at 142, 417 N.E.2d at 1331.
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Court's authority is discretionary on two levels. First, the Illinois
Supreme Court can refuse to consider the petition. Second, even if
it agrees to consider the petition, the supreme court can refuse to
grant the petition. 4
Because Horn decided only one consolidation petition, it leaves
unanswered several questions about the new procedure. First, it is
unclear under what circumstances the Illinois Supreme Court will
consolidate cases under its supervisory powers. The Horn court
found that the factors relevant to a forum non conveniens dismissal
were also "helpful in deciding whether to exercise our supervisory
powers and in what manner."55 Having emphasized factors of con-
venience, the court easily found that the three cases should be con-
solidated because "the parties, most of the witnesses, proofs, and
the accident itself are local to Shelby County."56
But is application of the forum non conveniens factors only
"helpful," not determinative? By its comment that those factors
would be helpful in deciding "in what manner" to exercise its su-
pervisory powers, the court implied that it contemplated other con-
solidation orders in which convenience would not be dispositive.
For example, if the court were to consolidate only for discovery
purposes, concern about a consolidation order's inconvenience to
parties and witnesses might cut against consolidation, but possibly
be overridden or displaced by concern about judicial economy.
The Horn decision thus raises a second question: whether the
supreme court's remarks signalled that it would entertain consoli-
dation petitions only for pretrial purposes. Horn itself provides no
clear answer. The Horn court consolidated the three cases for both
pretrial and trial purposes and left to the Shelby County circuit
judge the discretion to "sever for trial so many or such parts of
these consolidated cases as it deems necessary.""
Since the Horn decision, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
has given further indication that it will consolidate for discovery
purposes. In at least one unreported order, the court has consoli-
dated cases only for common discovery. In In re Salmonella Liti-
gation,58 the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated before one Cook
54. Id. at 152, 417 N.E.2d at 1335-36 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting) ("I opposed the
granting of leave to file the original petition and am of the opinion that it should now be
dismissed.").
55. Id. at 150, 417 N.E.2d at 1335.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 151, 417 N.E.2d at 1335.
58. No. 61974 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 27, 1985) (order granting consolidation for pretrial
discovery); In re Salmonella Litigation, No. 63629 (II1. Sup. Ct. June 30, 1986) (order
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County circuit judge all salmonella cases pending in the Illinois
state court system. After the common discovery was completed,
each case was remanded to the circuit court in which it was origi-
nally filed. Presumably, the Illinois Supreme Court in the salmo-
nella cases found the convenience factors "helpful" in deciding
whether to consolidate; but, because many of the cases had been
filed in the circuits where the plaintiffs resided, the overriding con-
cern that motivated the court must have been judicial economy,
not convenience to the parties.
By suggesting in Horn that it might consolidate cases for limited
purposes only - and by doing so in the salmonella litigation - the
Illinois Supreme Court has created a number of other potential
problems. Will it entertain a petition to reverse an earlier decision
to consolidate cases for trial on grounds that discovery conducted
subsequent to the consolidation order has revealed no efficiency in
trying the cases together? If the supreme court consolidates factu-
ally related cases in one circuit court only for pretrial purposes, as
in the salmonella litigation, may the transferee court sua sponte
transfer the cases to itself for trial, invoking the forum non con-
veniens doctrine of Torres?9 These and other questions remain
open and are the inevitable result of creating a consolidation proce-
dure through a single written opinion.
Perhaps the most troubling problem is that Horn's utility as a
consolidation procedure itself is questionable. It would seem
doubtful that the Illinois Supreme Court would routinely entertain
consolidation petitions. Chief Justice Goldenhersh's dissent in
Horn detailed some of the possible horrors the decision had pro-
duced.60 He commented:
The end result of this opinion, is that this court will of necessity
be required to entertain original actions with wholly inadequate
records .... With the numbers and types of cases pending before
us, I respectfully submit this court is far too busy to spend its
directing consolidated discovery); see also Schomber v. Jewel Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210
(N.D. 11. 1985) (description of procedural moves by the Illinois Supreme Court).
59. Federal courts routinely transfer cases to themselves for trial that have been
transferred to them initially for pretrial purposes. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust
Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); Pfizer, Inc.
v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in
Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 804-06 (1984); Weigel, The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D.
575, 581 (1978); Comment, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litiga-
tion, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1001-02 (1974).
60. Horn, 84 III. 2d at 152, 417 N.E.2d at 1335 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting).
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time refereeing races to the courthouse.6 '
Chief Justice Goldenhersh's nightmare has not yet materialized,
and perhaps never will. By the Illinois Supreme Court Clerk's esti-
mate, only a handful or fewer petitions for Horn consolidation
have been filed with the Illinois Supreme Court since 1981.62 It is
hard to explain why there have been so few petitions. One conceiv-
able answer, of course, is that Horn is an unnecessary development.
Perhaps Illinois courts are not presented frequently enough with
multiple related litigation to require the application of the Horn
decision. Alternately, even if related litigation is frequently dis-
persed among different Illinois circuits, perhaps Illinois litigants
are not interested in consolidation. But the claim that intercircuit
consolidation is unnecessary in Illinois strikes a dissonant chord.
Chief Justice Goldenhersh himself emphasized that multiple ac-
tions arising out of the same transaction are "not new in the annals
of the State."' 63 Moreover, the frequent use by litigants in the fed-
eral system of multidistrict consolidation procedures' suggests
that if consolidation procedures are readily available, they will be
employed.
A more plausible reason for Illinois litigants' infrequent resort to
Horn consolidation is its discretionary status. A litigant who seeks
intercircuit consolidation must first obtain permission from the Illi-
nois Supreme Court for leave to file an original petition. There is
the aura of the extraordinary in this procedure similar to obtaining
a writ of mandamus. Litigants may have perceived that in decid-
ing Horn, the Illinois Supreme Court did not want to invest its
limited resources in hearing numerous consolidation petitions.65 In
the minds of Illinois lawyers, Horn thus may have died a sorry
death as soon as it was born because of its discretionary nature.
B. Torres v. Walsh 66
In Torres, the Illinois Supreme Court finally decided that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens could be invoked when the more
61. Id. at 153, 417 N.E.2d at 1336 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting).
62. Telephone conversation with Juleann Hornyak, Clerk of the Illinois Supreme
Court (Mar. 2, 1989).
63. Horn, 84 I11. 2d at 152, 417 N.E.2d at 1336 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting).
64. See Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479, 480 (1989) (sta-
tistics showing that 10,200 actions have been transferred since 1968); Weigel, supra note
59; Comment, supra note 59.
65. Another plausible explanation for Horn's disuse is that Illinois litigants simply do
not know about Horn.
66. 98 Ill. 2d 338, 456 N.E.2d 601 (1983).
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convenient forum is another Illinois judicial district.67 The Torres
court also held that a circuit court has authority under the doctrine
to transfer a case from one Illinois judicial circuit to another when
venue is proper in the second county and the second county is
more convenient. 61 In so holding, the court created a transfer pro-
cedure identical to the federal procedure without the necessity
either of legislative enactment or rulemaking.
Torres involved a garden variety car crash in Sangamon County.
The plaintiffs, Elias and Celia Torres, filed their suit in Cook
County. The defendants then moved to transfer the case to Sanga-
mon County on convenience grounds, and the Cook County judge
ordered the transfer. 69 The plaintiffs then petitioned the Illinois
Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus. In deciding that the
circuit court had authority to transfer under forum non con-
veniens, the Illinois Supreme Court took a strictly historical ap-
proach. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, the Illinois
Supreme Court explained, originated in the common law of Eng-
land, "which Illinois adopted as it existed prior to the fourth year
of James the First" - in 1606.10 The court then examined a hand-
ful of English cases and found that when an "impartial trial could
not be obtained the court of the King's Bench had the authority to
transfer the trial to the next adjoining county."7 Because English
common law had acknowledged a transfer mechanism, the court
reasoned, the right to transfer is also contained in the Illinois doc-
trine of forum non conveniens.
Torres is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, the earliest
English case cited by the Torres court for the authority to transfer
was decided almost 100 years after "the fourth year of James the
First. '7 2 Thus, the English common law that Illinois adopted by
legislative act73 did not embody a right to transfer on grounds of
convenience. Second, because of the flimsiness of its legal argu-
ment, Torres can only be seen as a radical reform of Illinois proce-
dure, which destroyed "in one stroke" the Illinois Legislature's
history of unwavering deference to plaintiff's choice of forum.74
67. Id. at 351, 456 N.E.2d at 607.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 342-43, 456 N.E.2d at 603.
70. Id. at 347, 456 N.E.2d at 605. See also id. at 355, 456 N.E.2d at 609
(Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the fourth year of James the First's reign
occurred in 1606).
71. Id. at 348, 456 N.E.2d at 606.
72. Id. at 347-48, 456 N.E.2d at 605-06.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1, para. 801 (1987).
74. Torres, 98 I1. 2d at 355, 456 N.E.2d at 609 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting).
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Four years later, the Illinois Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged
that Torres was in fact a new rule masquerading as doctrinal inter-
pretation when it codified the Torres decision in Supreme Court
Rule 187.
By themselves, Torres and Supreme Court Rule 187 do not pro-
vide for gathering related claims and litigation into one suit. Com-
bined with section 2-1006 consolidation, 75 however, litigants
occasionally can employ Torres and rule 187 to consolidate related
litigation. A defendant might be able to consolidate two related
cases filed in different districts without having to petition the
supreme court for the extraordinary relief of Horn. The defendant
first would have to move successfully on grounds of convenience to
transfer one of the cases to the circuit court in which the second
case was filed. Then the defendant would have to move success-
fully to consolidate the cases under section 2-1006.
This combined use of statutory consolidation and forum non
conveniens in order to combine related litigation, however, is prob-
ably unworkable. As the Torres court explained, unless the bal-
ance of convenience strongly favors the defendant, "the plaintiff
should be able to exercise his statutory right to choose his fo-
rum."76 Thus, the defendant must bear the heavy burden of per-
suading a circuit court that jointly "the availability of an
alternative forum, the access to sources of proof, the accessibility of
witnesses, the relative advantages and obstacles to obtaining a fair
trial, the congestion of the court dockets, and the convenience of
the parties" point overwhelmingly in the direction of the defend-
ant's forum choice.77 Avoiding duplicative litigation is only one of
a variety of factors pertinent to a forum non conveniens determina-
tion. Moreover, when the defendant is faced with defending sev-
eral related cases and those cases are filed in more than two judicial
circuits, a defendant will be hard-pressed to get all the cases trans-
ferred to one court. Under these circumstances, in order to achieve
the fullest degree of judicial economy, the defendant must bear the
even heavier burden of persuading a number of judges in different
circuits to transfer their cases to the same circuit.78
75. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
76. Torres, 98 I1l. 2d at 351, 456 N.E.2d at 607.
77. Id.
78. ALl Complex Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 89; Trangsrud,supra note 59, at
802-03 ("This approach has proven of little value in achieving the consolidation of mass
tort cases in a single venue because it requires the unanimous cooperation of all transferor
judges to effect complete consolidation.").
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C. Laue v. Leifheit79
Section 5 of the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act 80
provides that a claim for contribution among joint tortfeasors
"may be asserted by a separate action before or after payment, by
counterclaim or by third-party complaint in a pending action." On
its face, section 5 appears to present the contribution claimant with
the option either to raise his or her claim in the plaintiff's original
action or to defer any attempt to enforce the claim until after reso-
lution of the plaintiff's original claim. 81 But in Laue, the supreme
court construed section 5 to require the contribution claimant to
assert his or her claim by counterclaim or third-party claim in the
plaintiff's original action.82 If the contribution claim is not as-
serted there, it is waived.
In construing section 5, the Illinois Supreme Court claimed sim-
ply to be analyzing the plain language of section 5.83 On its face,
that claim is dubious because the language of section 5 points in
the opposite direction. The court appears instead to have been
driven by concerns of judicial economy. Indeed, the court moved
briskly, if not nimbly, from its assertion that the language of sec-
tion 5 is plain to a policy discussion: "One jury should decide both
the liability to the plaintiff and the percentages of liability among
the defendants, so as to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits and the
possibility of inconsistent verdicts."84
There are other countervailing policies that the Laue court chose
to ignore or discount. For example, the court disregarded or dis-
counted the general assembly's countervailing intent as expressed
in the permissive counterclaim rule, section 2-608 of the Code, and
rejected the policy arguments of the contribution claimant in
Laue.85 In giving no weight to the intent underlying the permissive
counterclaim rule, the Illinois Supreme Court ignored that sec-
tion's policy of providing defendants a forum choice "if it would be
inconvenient or strategically inadvisable" to assert the counter-
79. 105 I11. 2d 191, 473 N.E.2d 939 (1984).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 305 (1989).
81. See Laue, 105 Ill. 2d at 198, 473 N.E.2d at 942 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting) ("This
section plainly establishes three ways in which a cause of action for contribution may be
asserted.").
82. Id. at 196, 473 N.E.2d at 941.
83. Id. "We believe it is clear from the statutory language ... that if there is a
pending action ...then the party seeking contribution must assert a claim by counter-
claim or by third-party claim." Id.
84. Id. at 196-97, 473 N.E.2d at 942.
85. See id. at 199, 473 N.E.2d at 943 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing the poli-
cies of section 2-608 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
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claim in plaintiff's action.86 In rejecting defendant Laue's conten-
tions, the Illinois Supreme Court discounted the joint tortfeasors'
strategic interests in presenting a united front on liability before the
jury in the plaintiff's original action, and in litigating the contribu-
tion issue only later when the tortfeasors' adverse positions would
not prejudice their interests.87
Although Laue rejected the policies of section 2-608, it does not
modify the permissive nature of counterclaims under Illinois law
except with respect to contribution claims. The irony of the Laue
decision is that it makes contribution counterclaims mandatory
when the defendants' strategic interests for deferring their counter-
claims - presenting a united front on liability - are greatest.
Otherwise, however, Laue leaves intact the permissive status of
other counterclaims where the defendant's strategic interests for
deferring are typically only that the defendant wants its own fo-
rum. Thus, Laue logically opens the door to modifying the Illinois
Code's counterclaim rule in accord with rule 13 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
IV. Two PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
As indicated previously, Illinois joinder and consolidation proce-
dures form a crazy quilt of mostly legislative devices that leave
Illinois procedure grossly inadequate to make the transaction the
unit of litigation in a single forum. Despite the Illinois Supreme
Court's recent ambitious attempts to create an efficient adjudica-
tion system, more needs to be done. The previous discussions sug-
gest that two reforms are particularly necessary. First, as the
reasoning of Laue itself implies, an Illinois compulsory counter-
claim rule modeled after rule 13 of the Federal Rules is long over-
due. Second, the Horn decision needs to be modified to place
intercircuit consolidation on equal footing with other Illinois join-
der and consolidation devices.
A. Compulsory Counterclaim Rule
So late in the day, it should go without saying that a procedural
system that values the transaction as the litigation unit should have
a compulsory counterclaim rule that mirrors federal rule 13.88 The
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-608 (1987) (historical and practice notes).
87. See Tisoncik v. Szczepankiewicz, 113 Il. App. 3d 240, 245-46, 446 N.E.2d 1271,
1275 (1st Dist. 1983) (discussing but rejecting the strategic interests of the joint tortfeasor
defendants).
88. See FED. R. Civ.P. 13(a). "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
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Laue court clearly expressed the policy reasons for such a rule by
emphasizing that the values of judicial economy override a defend-
ant's forum choice when the plaintiff's forum choice is accepta-
ble.8 9 Although forum shopping opportunities will always exist in
our legal system, legal doctrine should not affirmatively enhance
those opportunities, particularly when balanced against litigation
efficiency.9
Other factors also support the argument for a compulsory coun-
terclaim rule. At present, the Illinois judicial system may be suffer-
ing from the costs of its own gathering inefficiency. A September
1988 study of civil case backlog in Illinois circuit courts indicates
that seventy-nine percent of all civil jury cases claiming damages of
$15,000 or more exceeded American Bar Association time stan-
dards for resolution. 9' While a variety of factors contribute to case
backlog - including docket load and ineffective case management
- one of those factors surely is the Illinois Code's sanction of du-
plicative litigation.
Moreover, without a compulsory counterclaim rule, an Illinois
plaintiff can occasionally compel a defendant to file a claim arising
out of the same transaction as a counterclaim. The Laue decision
itself accomplishes that result for contribution claims. In addition,
Supreme Court Rule 187 and statutory consolidation allows the
plaintiff in the original action to seek transfer of the defendant's
reactive litigation to the original forum, and then to consolidate the
reactive litigation with the original claim.9" Finally, through Horn
consolidation, the plaintiff can seek the same result. Thus, proce-
dures for compelling a defendant to raise a counterclaim already
exist, although, with the exception of Laue, these devices are gen-
erally ineffective. A compulsory counterclaim rule would replace
these inadequate procedures with an efficient device.
B. Intercircuit Consolidation
As shown above, the Horn consolidation procedure has limited
utility. The solution to Horn is not to turn back the clock and
renounce the decision, but to develop an intercircuit consolidation
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim .. " Id.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
90. See Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C.L.
REV. 291, 312 (1988).
91. Illinois Calendar Management Study, supra note 6, at 1-5.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
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procedure that promotes the judicial economies of Horn without
unduly burdening the Illinois Supreme Court. Intercircuit consoli-
dation of multiple related litigation can produce efficiencies for all
those involved in the litigation.93 By avoiding duplication, consoli-
dation can produce significant savings for the judicial system and
litigants common to all or most of the actions. Additionally, con-
solidation can produce economies of scale for someone who is a
party in only one of the actions if that party coordinates pretrial
and trial activity with other parties on the same side of the suit.
Finally, witnesses can also benefit through consolidation by being
deposed or testifying only once, not several times in several
locations.
To be sure, there are plausible objections. One objection is that
the most judicially efficient forum may nonetheless be an inconve-
nient one for some of the litigants. Plaintiffs who reside in and file
their cases in Madison County may face significant hardships in
litigating, whether at the pretrial or trial stage, in Cook County.
This concern, however, can be mitigated by making pretrial con-
solidation turn on the convenience of parties and witnesses, as well
as the efficient conduct of such actions. 94 Thus, in deciding
whether and where to consolidate, both convenience and efficiency
should be paramount considerations. 95 In effect, the factors perti-
nent to transfer under Supreme Court Rule 187 would also be per-
tinent to intercircuit consolidation.
A second objection derives from a plaintiff's fear that she may
lose control over her claim if it is consolidated with other related
litigation. 96 This problem will arise, of course, only when numer-
ous cases are consolidated - mass tort litigation, for example -
not when only a few cases are consolidated, as in Horn. In the
mass tort consolidation, the transferee court typically will be com-
pelled to exercise control over the numerous cases, with their nu-
merous lawyers, by appointing liaison or lead counsel to represent
the common litigants in their common oral and written presenta-
tions.97 Without liaison counsel, the efficiencies of consolidation
may be drowned in a sea of duplicative motions and discovery.
Plaintiffs, however, are sometimes wary of liaison counsel arrange-
93. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 59, at 1003.
94. See Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982).
95. In consolidating for pretrial purposes, however, a court need not transfer cases
only to places of proper venue. See Comment, supra note 59, at 1011-12.
96. See Trangsrud, supra note 59, at 820-22.
97. See, e.g., MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.22 (2d ed. 1985).
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ments because they fear they may be turning over their claims to a
stranger. But a sensitive circuit judge can account for this concern
about loss of individual control by making clear to all litigants that
by allowing liaison counsel to undertake matters common to the
consolidated group, the individual litigants waive no rights to pres-
ent issues unique to their cases or to conduct particularized discov-
ery. 98 In a mass tort case, for example, this sensitivity would
include allowing each plaintiff to conduct and manage the damages
part of her trial.
A third objection is that intercircuit consolidation will diminish
a plaintiff's forum-shopping opportunities. Because there are sig-
nificant differences in jury awards among Illinois circuits, 99 an indi-
vidual plaintiff often seeks to file his or her case in the highest-
award circuit that Illinois venue laws permit."° A plausible argu-
ment can be made that consolidation for trial in the interests of
efficiency unfairly overrides this tactical consideration. The short
answer to this concern is that the Illinois Supreme Court, by pro-
viding for transfer on convenience grounds in Torres and Supreme
Court Rule 187, has already indicated its view that convenience
and judicial economy sometimes may trump the plaintiff's forum
choice. An intercircuit consolidation rule would be consistent with
that view. As a structural matter, the Illinois procedural system
should not and, as exemplified in rule 187, does not exist systemati-
cally to promote a plaintiff's best shot at a high damage award.'o
A final objection to intercircuit consolidation is its potentially
burdensome impact on counties with few judges and sizeable dock-
ets. Judges in these counties might be overwhelmed by the consoli-
dation in their courts of a substantial number of related civil cases
originally filed elsewhere. There are two ways by which an Illinois
Judicial Panel could accommodate this problem. One is by in-
structing the panel to consider as a factor in its decision the ability
of a circuit court to handle the consolidated cases along with its
other criminal and civil cases. A second way is by exercising the
Illinois Supreme Court's authority under article VI, section 16 of
the Illinois Constitution to "assign a Judge temporarily to any
98. See, e.g., MacAlister, 263 F.2d at 68; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
§ 20.222 (2d ed. 1985).
99. See, e.g., Baker v. Burlington N. R.R., 149 Ill. App. 3d 674, 683, 500 N.E.2d
1113, 1120 (5th Dist. 1986) (Jones, J., dissenting) (plaintiff "has taken in deliberate fash-
ion what has become a well-worn path carved by plaintiffs en route to filing their cases in
Madison County").
100. See Trangsrud, supra note 59, at 820.
101. But see id.
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court."'' °2 To the extent that a circuit court, given its limited re-
sources and existing docket, could not handle a group of consoli-
dated cases, an Illinois Judicial Panel (if delegated the authority by
the Illinois Supreme Court), or the supreme court itself, could as-
sign a judge from another circuit to handle the consolidated cases.
None of the foregoing objections therefore weighs against adopt-
ing an Illinois intercircuit consolidation. Given the efficiencies that
can be achieved, Illinois should adopt a consolidation procedure
essentially modeled after the federal Multidistrict Litigation Act. 103
That Act created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
The Panel, comprised of seven district or appellate judges ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,"° is authorized
to transfer civil actions pending in different districts and involving
common factual questions to one district judge for consolidated
pretrial proceedings. The Panel may do so when transfer and con-
solidation "will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and
will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions."'0 5 The
Act also requires that the transferee judge, at or before completion
of pretrial discovery, remand each separate action to the district in
which it originated, "unless it shall have been previously
terminated."' 06
The federal Multidistrict Litigation Act would solve both of
Horn's inadequacies: Horn's extraordinary status and the poten-
tial burdens it places on the Illinois Supreme Court. Under an Illi-
nois intercircuit consolidation rule, an Illinois Judicial Panel would
hear all petitions for transfer and consolidation, thereby resolving
the problem of Horn's discretionary status. Further, the Judicial
Panel would be comprised of circuit and appellate judges exper-
ienced with the problems of complex litigation, thereby relieving
the Illinois Supreme Court of the burden of considering original
petitions for consolidation.
If an Illinois procedure were exactly modeled after the federal
provision, it would permit the Panel to consolidate only for pretrial
purposes. In passing the federal act, Congress took the position
that the federal Judicial Panel would be in a good position to evalu-
ate the efficiencies of consolidating common discovery, but would
not be properly positioned to evaluate consolidation for trial. 107
102. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1982).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982).
106. Id.
107. See Trangsrud, supra note 59, at 805-08.
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Moreover, Congress believed that pretrial consolidation achieved
efficiencies without unduly interfering with the plaintiff's choice of
forum, which might result from consolidation for trial. 0 None-
theless, as the federal Multidistrict Litigation Act ultimately has
been interpreted, the transferee court often retains the consolidated
cases for trial following pretrial transfer by the Judicial Panel. The
transferee court sometimes has transferred the cases to its own
court for trial pursuant to the federal analogue of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
0 9
Accordingly, the drafters of an Illinois consolidation rule would
need to consider whether the language should authorize consolida-
tion for all purposes, or only for pretrial purposes. An ideal rule
would provide for both options. There are obviously cases - the
salmonella litigation is one example -that are appropriate for pre-
trial consolidation, but not for trial consolidation. Sometimes the
efficiencies of coordinated discovery override any inconvenience to
the litigants. But those same efficiencies might not be present for a
consolidated trial; the individual questions of law or fact present in
each case might predominate over the common questions. Alter-
natively, the efficiencies of a consolidated trial might not override
the unfairness of compelling parties to litigate in an inconvenient
forum. Indeed, the forum appropriate for pretrial consolidation
might not even be a place of proper venue for some of the consoli-
dated actions. Thus, it makes sense to draft a procedure allowing,
when appropriate, for pretrial consolidation only. But it is obvi-
ously sometimes efficient to consolidate for both pretrial and trial
purposes. The consolidated Horn cases are perfect examples: a
three car collision producing three lawsuits in three different coun-
ties. No sensible single judicial system would permit these three
cases to proceed to trial separately.
The drafters of an Illinois rule would have to decide who deter-
mines whether cases consolidated for pretrial should also be tried
together. Should the Illinois Judicial Panel or the transferee judge
make this decision? Here too the established federal approach pro-
vides a sensible answer. While it is arguable that a Judicial Panel,
experienced in consolidation questions, would be more able gener-
ally to make the decision,110 the transferee judge usually will be in
a better position to decide the issue in a particular case. The trans-
108. Id.
109. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
110. ALI Complex Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 90; Comment, supra note 59, at
1037-40.
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feree judge, after conducting coordinated discovery and pretrial,
has become closely connected with the factual and legal issues in
each case. The transferee judge therefore is better qualified than
the Judicial Panel to determine whether these particular cases
should be consolidated for trial or remanded to the original circuit
court for trial.' 1'
C. Reform by Legislative Act or Supreme Court Rule?
A final question to consider is whether the Illinois General As-
sembly or the Illinois Supreme Court should undertake procedural
reform. It is now well-settled that the Illinois Supreme Court and
the Illinois General Assembly possess concurrent power to regu-
late practice and procedure in the Illinois courts." 2 The supreme
court's power, derived from article VI, section 16 of the constitu-
tion, is preeminent.' The general assembly may act on a proce-
dural issue, as it has done in the Code of Civil Procedure, only if
the Illinois Supreme Court has not acted.' When a supreme
court rule and a legislative provision conflict, the supreme court
rule takes precedence over the statute."'
Accordingly, either the general assembly could enact or the
supreme court could promulgate a compulsory counterclaim rule
and an intercircuit consolidation procedure."I6 Under the current
climate, given the Illinois Supreme Court's recent activity, system-
atic reform of Illinois' gathering mechanisms more likely will re-
sult from supreme court rulemaking, not from legislative
enactment. Moreover, the Illinois General Assembly's conduct in
procedural revision in recent years stands in sharp contrast to the
court's recent innovations by appellate decision. In 1982, the gen-
eral assembly revised without reforming the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure.' ' In many instances, the 1982 Code clearly values the
111. ALI Complex Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 90-91.
112. People v. Capoldi, 37 IIl. 2d 11, 16, 225 N.E.2d 634, 637 (1967); ILL. CONST.
art. VI, § 16 (constitutional commentary).
113. People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977); ILL. CONST. art. VI,
§ 16 (constitutional commentary).
114. People v. Capoldi, 37 I11. 2d 11, 225 N.E.2d 634 (1967); ILL. CONST. art. VI,
§ 16 (constitutional commentary).
115. People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
116. One might contest whether the Illinois Supreme Court is authorized to create a
judicial consolidation panel - in effect, a new court. Article VI, section 16, however,
explicitly authorizes the supreme court to "assign a Judge temporarily to any court."
Presumably, that power would include the power to authorize the supreme court to as-
sign a handful of circuit or appellate judges the duty of hearing consolidation petitions for
a limited time period.
117. See Jenner, Tone, & Martin, History, Source and Effect of the Civil Practice Law,
[Vol. 20
Gathering Related Litigation in Illinois
individual litigant's interest in conducting litigation in the forum of
choice over the often inconsistent value of efficient adjudication."'
Should the supreme court nonetheless defer to the democratic
process and await procedural reform by the general assembly?
There is no good reason for such deference. Indeed, given the Illi-
nois Constitution's grant to the supreme court of preeminent, ad-
ministrative, and supervisory authority over all Illinois courts,
arguably any deference to the general assembly would amount to
an abdication by the Illinois Supreme Court of its constitutional
responsibilities. One might just as well ask instead whether the
general assembly should defer to the Illinois Supreme Court's supe-
rior authority. But given the Illinois Supreme Court's clear signals
in Horn, Torres, and Laue, the legislature, in passing a compulsory
counterclaim rule and providing for a judicial consolidation panel,
should have no fear of intruding in the supreme court's business.
Indeed, for fifty years or more, the Illinois General Assembly and
the Illinois Supreme Court have shared concurrent power over Illi-
nois practice and procedure. One of them should implement the
reforms proposed in this Article.
V. CONCLUSION
The innovations of Horn, Torres, and Laue launched Illinois into
the mainstream of consolidation reform. But there are other steps
to take. The Illinois General Assembly or the Illinois Supreme
Court should continue Illinois' development of effective procedures
for gathering related litigation into one forum.
reprinted in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, at xxxii (Smith-Hurd 1983) (1982 revision made no
substantive changes in procedure law).
118. See supra notes 9-45 and accompanying text.
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